From d0b5da0db4dad91cb8ae3a8cb4effbab34789f32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Preston Pan Date: Sun, 26 May 2024 18:42:13 -0700 Subject: more mindmap --- mindmap/philosophy.org | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) create mode 100644 mindmap/philosophy.org (limited to 'mindmap/philosophy.org') diff --git a/mindmap/philosophy.org b/mindmap/philosophy.org new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1a26e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/mindmap/philosophy.org @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +:PROPERTIES: +:ID: f4d70abf-242c-41b7-b0dd-d7f1813cfb33 +:END: +#+title: philosophy +#+author: Preston Pan +#+html_head: +#+html_head: +#+html_head: +#+options: broken-links:t +* Introduction +Philosophy is a hard to describe term, but this mindmap defines this term as the study of living life optimally. We use +this definition to ground meta-ethical frameworks in [[id:326eb3f8-680a-432c-bf69-42ba4d366116][egoism]], which gives meaning to perscriptive ethical statements (which +this mindmap holds there is regularly no meaning to in the colloquial sense). This mindmap defines an ethical statement +such as "it is wrong to do x" as a statement which says, "it maximizes utility for your own life if not x". Of course, +because it is an emperically justified statement to say that most people act the same, this can ground commonly held +moral beliefs. There are several possible refutations to this point of view, but this mindmap maintains that refutations +to this point of view usually appeal to some feeling of wrongness rather than being definitionally inconsistent, which +is again an instantiation of this point of view (to argue moral truths from a point of view of a feeling of wrongness is +an instantiation or a confirmation of this point of view). + +For instance, one possible counterargument that is brought up involves the fact that this theory equates preferences to +moral statements. "I prefer red" and "x is morally right" indeed /feel/ like two separate things. This mindmap maintains +that they are two different things in many senses, but that the fundamental assertion of these two statements is the same. +It is just a different kind of emotion, but there is no underlying fact of the matter that one can point to with regards +to moral theory. + +Note that there are several arguments that facts are treated on a separate footing to moral theory under such a framework. +Indeed it is true that this mindmap will rest on some emperical facts, but this mindmap maintains that doing this is a +perfectly internally consistent and descriptive standpoint. From here on, we will use ethical and moral statements as +a description of people, rather than a description of some real moral fact. -- cgit